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insurrection, to fall to pieces again rather than to unite. Indeed, but for the powerful influence of the Norman conquest, it may be doubted whether the centrifugal tendencies would not have proved too strong to be resisted. To the Normans, perhaps, quite as much as to the native English, England owes that wonderful constitution which has secured at once unity of the whole and vigor of the parts, — almost the only constitution of modern Europe which has been able for any length of time to combine strength and liberty.

So far as Mr. Freeman's work extends, it leaves little to be desired either in the narration of events or the discussion of their significance and bearings. We shall look with interest for his succeeding volumes, to find described as graphically and vigorously the measures by which the conquered nation was held in subjection, the process by which feudal institutions became established in England, and finally the growth of a new political system, nobler than that which had been overthrown, because stronger and no less free.

W. F. ALLEN.

ART. VII. — *Paris en Décembre, 1851. Étude Historique sur Le Coup d'État.* Par EUGÈNE TÉNOT. Paris. 1868.

THE book which forms the subject of this article was published early in the autumn of 1868, and had, in the following December, reached its eleventh edition. The aim of M. Ténot is sufficiently manifest from the date of his Preface, July 14, 1868, for the 14th of July is the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille. Of M. Ténot himself there is very little to be said. He is a Parisian journalist of reputation, and one of the editors of the *Siècle*, — that is to say, a Republican. In 1865 he published a book on the *Coup d'État en Province*, which was very favorably received, and he has been urged and induced to follow it up by a study of the *Coup d'État* in Paris, a much more arduous task, from the difficulty of getting at the truth "through the mire of calumnies, falsehoods, dis-

guised incidents, and garbled documents in which the facts lie buried."

A new generation has grown up in the eighteen years since the *coup d'état* was accomplished; and where shall they go to learn the truth regarding the system under which they live? The history of the time just past is always the least known, because it is vaguely familiar to every one, and it takes much time and energy to collate newspapers, hunt through periodicals, and find out what was truth and what was gossip. The French newspapers of the time of the *coup d'état* were gagged, with the exception of two or three, known to be safe, and are consequently valueless for the purposes of history; the French reviews thought it not the time to deal with the situation, and were wisely silent; and the official documents, though printed and published, are not more accessible than official documents usually are. Louis Napoleon's friends and followers gave their version of what occurred in December, 1851, and have repeated it from time to time ever since. Any one, anxious to know what they have had to say, had better, without wading through Belouino and Mayer and Manduit, refer to M. Granier de Cassagnac's productions, — at once the best and the worst of their kind, — either the *Récit populaire des Événements de Décembre*, 1851, which appeared in 1852, and which is not now very easy to get, or to the more elaborate account in the second volume of his *Histoire de la Chute de Louis Philippe et du Rétablissement de l'Empire* (1857). The story is told as M. Granier de Cassagnac can tell a story; he has been trained in that school of French journalism which handles a pen and a sword equally well, which can stab a man with a sneer one day, and shoot him for resenting it the next; and he has written no line which, for its dulness, he would wish to blot. In 1851 he was on the staff of the *Constitutionnel*, and he has incorporated some of his very telling articles into his book. The *Constitutionnel*, the ardent prophet of the Empire, was, in those days, under the control of Dr. Véron, and, in the sixth volume of his *Memoirs*, there are many details of the wires and wire-pullers of the time, perhaps not always accurate, but very amusing. The *Memoirs* were published in 1857, and had, as the French say, a great suc-

cess of curiosity; but they met with many contradictions, and he was obliged to publish his *New Memoirs*, and to give his authorities. Even then he did not have a success of truth.

The writings on the other side labor under the disadvantage of having been written out of France, by Frenchmen who could only give their word for their accuracy, or by foreigners, like Mr. Kinglake, whose most interesting chapter (*Invasion of the Crimea*, Vol. I. Chap. XIV.) has all the unreality of a fine fable. M. Ténot is a Frenchman, living in France, with all the usual facilities and some unusual ones for writing this history, used to hard literary work, and eager to do this special thing. He derived his information from the official documents, so that there is not one word in the book which the government could suppress, and he tells the story as simply as possible, without comment of any sort. This is a great gain to us who read him across the broad or the narrow seas; for, though the fire below is felt throughout the work, there is none of that phrase-making that is so natural to a Frenchman, and so unpleasant to the unrhetorical Englishman.

The history of France up to 1848 is well known. From 1830 to 1848 the French lived and prospered under a constitutional monarchy. It was an experiment, but it seemed to work well enough. The king read the English papers; the royal family lived like English gentlemen and ladies; the deputies did a vast amount of talking; the people made endless fun of the king; and there was no reason why this state of things should not have endured, had the king been a little wiser, or M. Guizot a little more flexible. But the demands made by the Opposition in 1847 for an extension of the suffrage were received by the king with extreme irritation, which he showed in his speech at the opening of the Chambers, December 27, 1847. On the 1st of January, 1848, he lost his best friend and counsellor, his more than sister, Madame Adelaide. In the debates that followed the address from the throne, the king's foolish words were harped upon incessantly; there were loud complaints of the interdiction of a great socialist banquet, which was to have taken place February 22d. On the 21st of February there were signs of an impending riot in Paris. That

evening the king said, "All this does not amount to anything: it is only the talk of the *cafés*"; and again, speaking of the irritation of the deputies of the left, "It is a fire of straw, a fire of straw!" He seems to have learnt the temper of his people from the English papers, — not the safest of interpreters in such a matter. On the 22d fighting began in the streets; on the 23d, concession began in the cabinet; on the 24th, Emile de Girardin burst into the king's room and asked him to abdicate, and he abdicated. He signed the act of abdication very slowly, but as quickly as his gloved hand would permit, and an hour or so later, fled from Paris, — a man of straw flying before a fire of straw; for when this had burnt itself out, it was clear that no one had wished the king to go, and that no one was glad of what had happened, except, indeed, the Duchesse de Montpensier, who had got out of the country with a good deal of difficulty, and who greatly preferred the risks and excitement of her escape to the dull decency of the royal home at the Tuileries. The year that followed was a dreadful year of anarchy, — anarchy tempered by Lamartine's speeches; and it ended in the declaration of a Republic which no one wished for, and the formation of a Constitution of which no one approved.

At this point M. Ténot begins his book, and his introductory chapter is devoted to a brief summary of the events which took place between the Presidential election of 1848 and the 2d of December, 1851. The Republican Constitution was definitively voted November 4, 1848. The government was divided between two powers, an Assembly, the thinking, willing brain; and a President, the obedient executive arm. The President was to be elected by universal suffrage for four years, and was not to be re-eligible until after an interval of four years. The Constitution was subject to revision, and every Assembly, in its third and last session, had a right to order such a revision, and by a vote of three fourths to call a special Assembly for that purpose. Universal suffrage, freedom of the press, and freedom of assemblage were assured; and it was these great advantages which reconciled the majority to the objectionable features of the Constitution and carried it through. It was, however, a compromise between the democratic hopes and the

monarchical traditions of France, and contained in itself the principles of its own destruction. The party of reaction in the Assembly had made a skilful use of the impression left by the dreadful days of June, 1848, to infuse as much monarchism as possible into the Constitution, — so that the Republican Constitution of Republican France retained all the evils of the monarchy, and added to them all the dangers of democracy. It maintained entire that civil organization which was the work of the first Napoleon after the 18th Brumaire, — “that network of centralization which stifles individual and corporate resistance, and prepares the way for the despotism of an assembly or of an emperor,”* and which renders necessary an immense army of functionaries, all, of course, easily bought by a chief, president, or other; it confirmed the Concordat, thus subsidizing the clergy, who were all, of course, hostile to democracy; it kept up a large standing army, recruited by conscription, ready to follow any leader, above all a Bonaparte; finally, it gave the choice of the magistrates to the President; so that, in case of any collision between the Assembly and the President, the Assembly had the right to accuse the President and bring him to trial before a High Court, if only the President, who had the army, the functionaries, the priests, and the magistrates at his back, should choose to be brought. The Constituent Assembly had, indeed, taken one precaution against any act of violence on the part of the executive, — a precaution showing its sturdy confidence in the goodness of human nature. Article sixty-eight of the Constitution declared that any measure by which the President dissolved or prorogued the National Assembly, or put any obstacle in the way of its mandate, was a crime of high treason. By this act alone he was to be considered deprived of his functions, and all citizens were commanded to refuse him obedience. Article forty-eight ordered that the President should take an oath to the Republic and to the Constitution. He alone was to take this oath; all other functionaries were exempt.

The two leading candidates for the Presidency were General Eugène Cavaignac and Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. Cavaignac had been at the head of the executive since June, 1848, and

* De Tocqueville.

was perhaps the man of the time best fitted for the position of President. He was brave, patriotic, disinterested; the worst Granier de Cassagnac can find to say of him is that he was good, but not good enough.

Louis Napoleon's early life is too well known to bear retelling. He was the nephew and heir of Napoleon I. The Revolution of February found him in England, and he came at once to Paris. By a curious accident, the packet which brought him over to Boulogne carried back to England the Duke de Nemours, who had remained in Paris a day longer than his father, to secure, if possible, the throne to his brother's children. The Duke's two faithful friends, who had accompanied him to Boulogne, were waiting in the railway-carriage that was to take them back to Paris, when the door opened suddenly, and in came two men, the Prince Louis Bonaparte, whom one of them had known at Ham, and his follower, M. Fialin de Persigny. So the four talked familiarly all the way to Paris, instead of meditating on the turns of fortune. The Prince, however, was not permitted to remain in Paris, and he returned to England, leaving his cause in the hands of some devoted friends, who succeeded in collecting a strong Napoleonic party,—not a very difficult task, in view of the prodigious influence exerted by the name and memory of the first Emperor. In the summer he was elected to the Assembly by four departments. He declined the election; was then re-elected by these four, and another, and took his seat September 26, 1848. His letters during the interval and his speech on the day of his entrance into the Assembly are well worth reading and pondering. "No one is more resolved to devote himself to the defence of order and the enfranchisement of the Republic than I am. I am not an ambitious man. . . . I shall always remain faithful to the duties imposed on me by your suffrages and the will of the Assembly. Were I elected President, . . . I should devote myself wholly and without reservation to the enfranchisement of a Republic wise in its laws, honest in its intentions, great and strong in its acts."

There were other candidates, but none of any prominence. Lamartine's day was over, and Changarnier's had not yet

come ; “ Ledru-Rollin represented the penury rather than the principles of his party ; Raspail was a socialist notable for his frenzy,” but otherwise a man of no account. The election took place on the 10th of December. It was a beautiful day, according to Granier de Cassagnac. Every one in France said “ The sun of Austerlitz,” and villagers walked in procession to the polls, headed by the clergy, even the lame and paralytic joining in, so that a touch of the miraculous was not wanting. It has been said that a million or more of these peasants thought they were voting for the great Emperor, just returned from St. Helena, an illusion that might have been dispelled, one would think, by a schoolmaster or two in the procession ; but the election was a perfectly fair one, and its validity has never been contested. Louis Napoleon was elected by an immense majority. “ We are lost,” said Marrast, on the night of the election. “ He knows the whole power of his name. He knows what he can do, and what he can do he will choose to do.” He entered on his duties December 20th, made a neat little speech, was cheered, shook hands with Cavaignac, who, they say, hesitated slightly, and drove off to the Elysée, the palace set apart for the President’s occupation. Of those who saw him go in some were far-sighted enough to see that he would leave the Elysée only for the Tuileries.

At the outset the Assembly and the President were perfectly in accord. His first step beyond the boundaries fixed for him was the ordering of the attack on Rome in April, 1849, against the will of the Constituent Assembly. This trespass was covered by a vote of the Legislative Assembly, chosen in May of that year ; but it made a breach between the President and the Republican party that was never healed. The Republicans, however, were the minority in the Chamber of Deputies ; with the majority, who were of monarchical tendencies, the rupture, though slower in coming, was quite as sure. On the 31st May, 1850, the famous Electoral Law was passed, which restricted universal suffrage, by exacting three years’ residence in one place. Its effect was to strike from the lists three millions of voters. It has always been said that Louis Napoleon was opposed to this law ; this M. Ténot affirms to be untrue, though he agrees that the breach with the Assembly came soon

after. The perturbation caused by the President's speeches that summer was carried to the highest pitch by the incidents of the great review in October, where the cavalry shouted loudly, "Vive Napoléon ! Vive l'Empereur !" but the infantry defiled in silence, having received orders from their commanding general, Neumayer, to obey the regulation of silence when under arms. For this General Neumayer was deprived of his command, and, though he was restored in a fortnight, even the trusting souls who framed articles forty-eight and sixty-eight must have seen reason for fear.

The President's message of November 12 was, as usual, a skilful imitation of an honest man's words, and the sky brightened for a few days, but was soon clouded over again. General Changarnier, commanding the army in Paris, the bulwark of the Assembly, the one obstacle in the way of a military *coup d'état*, was deprived of his command. The President had exercised a legal right, and the Assembly could do nothing. "The Empire is made," said Thiers in the great debate which followed. The Assembly passed a vote of want of confidence in the ministers. The last time such a vote had been passed was in June, 1830, — an ominous precedent. The new ministers asked for a supplementary credit of 1,800,000 francs, for the President, who had been living beyond his means. It was refused, and he was obliged to sell his horses. It has been stated by a Napoleonic writer that the idea of a *coup d'état* was conceived then (February, 1851).

It was evident that things could not continue as they were, and as the year 1851 wore on they grew worse and worse. The Presidential term expired in 1852, and under the Constitution Louis Napoleon was not re-eligible. No one believed that he would give up the power he held, even had there been another prominent candidate ; no one believed that the Constitution could be permanent, or even long-lived ; on the whole, the least dangerous step in a night so black seemed to be to revise the Constitution, so as to make his re-election either legal or utterly impossible. The question of a revision was intrusted to a committee comprising De Tocqueville, De Broglie, Montalembert, Favre, Barrot, Baze, Cavaignac, Berryer, and the report, which was written by De Tocqueville himself, was

in favor of revision; but the measure was voted down in the Assembly. After this, nothing could constitutionally be done, and the dread which the thought of the coming elections inspired was so great and so deep as to amount to a panic. Socialism was reported on the increase, and anything seemed better than the dreadful days of June, — days which had been the consequence of socialist teachings.

The Paris elections of 1850 had gone wholly Republican in different shades of red, the reddest of all being Eugène Sue, of romantic memory. Republicanism was gaining ground all over France, and was to some minds as dreadful as socialism, though the Republican leaders in the Assembly were such men as Michel (de Bourges), Jules Favre, Quinet, Cavaignac, Charras, and Victor Hugo. There was little hope that the majority would save society, for, though strongly monarchical, not even its dread of the minority could keep it together, and in 1851 it was in shreds. There was the Legitimist party, headed by Berryer and De Falloux, who prayed for Henry V., and made pious pilgrimages to Ems and Wiesbaden, there to meet the Count de Chambord, and to lay at his feet bouquets of flowers secretly culled in the garden of the Tuileries. There was the Orleanist party, headed by the Duke de Broglie and M. de Montalembert, who wished for a son or grandson of Louis Philippe, and made other pilgrimages, not quite so pious, to Claremont and Brussels. There were the Fusionists, who, counselling a union of the two branches of the house of Bourbon, held meetings and made plans, and were headed by Molé. There was, too, Changarnier, “Cromwell,” “Monk,” “Sphinx,” whom Louis Napoleon had tried and failed to corrupt. He was supposed to have numberless plans and to be ready for any emergency. Then there was Thiers, so cruelly and so cleverly nicknamed *Mirabeau-mouche*; who buzzed away on the wheel of the state-coach, and who, of course, had a plan. Certainly, society seemed to need salvation, and the Elyséens, as the President's friends were called, did their utmost to terrify the perplexed and to perplex the terrified, never ceasing to remark that Providence, with whose designs they professed themselves intimately acquainted, could and would provide a saviour of society, and who should that be but Louis Napoleon Bonaparte?

Rumors of a *coup d'état* were rife during the summer and autumn of 1851, and, according to some Bonapartist writers, one was projected, but postponed for various reasons. On the 17th October the Faucher-Baroche ministry retired, and ten days later their places were filled by men personally devoted to the President. St. Arnaud was made Minister of War, — a most alarming appointment, — and his circular dated October 28 was not soothing. It contained such passages as these : “ Under arms, military regulations are the only law. The responsibility of an order rests only with the chief from whom it emanates.” It had now become of urgent importance that the army should have a chief on whom France could rely.

The Assembly met on the 4th of November. The President's message was fair in sound as usual, and closed with a formal proposition for the abolition of the law of May 31, and the re-establishment of universal suffrage. This was a bold stroke on his part, for, if the Assembly had acceded to his request and followed the recognized wishes of the people, he would have found himself foiled on the 1st of December. But the royalist majority rejected the proposition, and prepared to secure to themselves the control of the army, who, it was agreed, would follow any leader. With this view, the questors, Baze, Leflô, and De Panat, introduced the celebrated “ questors' proposition,” which confirmed the existing law, by which the president of the Assembly could call upon the army in case of danger, and disobedience was forbidden. This proposition was moved November 6th, and voted upon November 17th. Of the discussion upon it, which was extremely violent and exciting, M. Ténot gives a brief account, which is well worth reading. St. Arnaud was present, in his scarlet trousers, ready for any emergency ; but he left the house before the vote was taken, saying with a laugh and a significant look, “ There is too much noise in this house, I am going for the guard.” The resolution was rejected by a vote of 408 to 300. They say that, when he heard it, St. Arnaud cried out, “ We should have done very well without ! ” but the President thought differently. The news reached him as he was about to mount his horse. “ It is perhaps better so,” he said, “ and his countenance resumed its serenity.”

Perhaps it was better so ; the blow was only delayed, and the fortnight that elapsed gave the conspirators time to perfect their plans and put people off their guard. Meanwhile the Assembly were waiting for Louis Napoleon to commit some overt act which should authorize a blow from them ; but the secret was perfectly kept. The President's first confidants, counsellors, and, to a great extent, instigators, were MM. de Morny, de Persigny, and Fleury. M. Ténot's biographical sketches of these men are necessarily of the briefest, and there is that to be said about each one of them which will not be said on his tombstone, as also about St. Arnaud, and some of the lesser agents in the scheme.

M. de Morny played by far the most important part of them all ; indeed, he has never received his full share of the discredit. He was born in 1811 ; the *Dictionnaire des Contemporains* does not say anything about his parents, nor about the old gentleman from Mauritius who sold him his name of De Morny and his title of count. He was brought up by Madame de Souza, a charming woman of a peculiarly French type, whose first husband was guillotined, who wrote romances, and, amid all vicissitudes, kept a *salon* until she died, in 1836. She was all that a grandmother should be to the young De Morny, and he probably owed to her those charming manners, which, added to his own personal attraction, made him so successful in society of all kinds. He must always have had more or less distinction of his own, for some one meeting him once in Talleyrand's anteroom, a lad of twelve, going away from a visit to that virtuous prelate, was struck by him, and heard Talleyrand say of him, "That little fellow will be minister some day." At seventeen he was studying theology with all his might, "resolved to get to the bottom of it," he said. Under Louis Philippe, he served in Africa. "Morny goes to Africa," writes the Duke of Orleans, "and all the women are in despair." Probably it was the husbands who were in despair when Morny returned soon after, left the army, and devoted himself to the cultivation of sugar in Southern France. He was elected deputy for his department, and was one of the leading men of the "party of youth" under Louis Philippe, but was less known in 1851 as a politician than as a great speculator and a bril-

liant man of fashion. He was admirably adapted for a state of society where charm counts for more than morality; he had that breadth of interest which belongs to high polish, and which has somewhat the effect of sympathy and unselfishness; he was clever, ready, vigorous enough, lovable, bright, daring, and had that best of habits, the habit of success. When he died, in 1865, some one said, "Perhaps Morny is again in luck." He had always been very intimate with Louis Napoleon, whom he wonderfully resembled in appearance and bearing. In 1849 he said: "All this will end in a *coup d'état*, and I will make the *coup*. When you see me in the ministry, you may say 'Now.' " He was made minister on the night of the 1st of December.

M. de Persigny began life as a non-commissioned officer named Fialin. After a while he remembered that his family had a right to the much finer name of De Persigny, and now all the world remembers it too. About 1831 he became an enthusiastic upholder of Napoleonic ideas, and undertook to propagate them in a journal called *L'Occident*, of which he published one number. This brought him into contact with Louis Napoleon, whose fortunes he ever after followed. He took an active share in the enterprises of Strasbourg and Boulogne, and, as we have seen, returned with the Prince after the Revolution of February. He married Ney's daughter, and became a duke, a senator, and a privy councillor. He does not seem to have counted for as much as the others in the execution of the plot, but he probably did his best, and received his reward.

Colonel Fleury, whose connection with the plot has been overrated by Mr. Kinglake, though his personal influence seems to be underrated by the world, came from a respectable middle-class family of Paris. His youth was very stormy, and, having run through his fortune, he went into the army as a common soldier. He rose rapidly, and his knowledge of horses got him a place on the President's staff. He did his share of the work admirably, and became general, senator, imperial aide-de-camp, and powerful in the imperial stables. Last year he was appointed Envoy to Italy.

Early in 1851, when the *coup d'état* was first in contempla-

tion, it was evident that the great need was officers of high rank on whom the President could rely. He said carelessly one day, "If we were to make generals?" and the idea was caught up and acted on. Colonel Fleury was sent to Algeria to see what he could find, and he found St. Arnaud, who was all they could have wished for a Minister of War; all that he needed was rank, and rank was given him in the war against the Kabyles, which Belouino says was undertaken only for that purpose. Before his departure for the Kabyle expedition, Fleury went to see Véron, then editing the *Constitutionnel*, and said to him, "It would be very agreeable to the President to have General St. Arnaud's rare merits and coming services in Kabylia put in a strong and clear light." So the services which Fleury had foretold were duly trumpeted, and St. Arnaud acquired his rank and was made Minister of War. The rise, however, was a little too rapid, and the man had been rather too bad, as Cavaignac, who had known him well in Africa, remarked at the time. In 1848 he had been nearly massacred by the mob, and he hated the people of Paris with a bitter hatred, which was soon to be gratified. He knew what he had to do, and he was ready and willing to do it. General Magnan, commanding the army in Paris, was not at first let into the secret. He had begged not to be told what was required of him until the last moment; but, after the middle of November, he called together twenty-one of his generals, sounded them by a significant speech, and found they were to be trusted. The police the plotters were sure of through M. de Maupas, who was made prefect October 27. During the last days of November the National Guard was rendered powerless by a trick, and M. de St. Georges, the director of the government printing-office, was bought up. All was now ready for action.

M. Granier de Cassagnac says that on the 1st of December M. de Falloux sent to the President to offer his services in behalf of any *coup d'état* made by the majority. The President said to the messenger, "Let him come to-morrow at ten, and we will talk about it." He came the next day at ten, and thanked the President for saving France.

The 2d of December, the anniversary of the battle of Aus-

terlitz, was the day chosen for the execution of the plot. The night before, the President held his usual reception. Many people were there; among others, the new chief of staff of the National Guard, Colonel Vieyra. The President, who was leaning against a mantel-piece, beckoned to him to approach, and said, in a low voice, "Colonel, are you strong enough to show no signs of emotion in your countenance?" "Prince, I think so." "Very well, it is to be to-night. Can you promise me that the call to arms shall not be beaten to-morrow?" "Yes, Prince, if I have enough men to carry out my orders." "See St. Arnaud. You must sleep to-night at head-quarters." "But, if I were seen spending the night in an arm-chair at head-quarters, people would be astonished." "You are right. Be there at six in the morning: you shall be warned. Let no National Guard go out in uniform. Go. No, not yet, it would look as if I had sent you away." They say that Vieyra prevented any call to arms the next morning by the effectual method of breaking in the drum-heads.

The Prince left the reception-room rather early, as was usual with him, and at eleven every one had gone, except those who remained closeted with him,—Morny, St. Arnaud, Maupas, and the Prince's secretary, Mocquart, who knew of the plot, but took no active part in it. M. de Morny had been at the theatre for a little while. During the *entr'acte* he went into the box of a lady, who said to him, "M. de Morny, they have been saying that the President is going to sweep out the Chamber. What shall you do?" "Madame," he answered, "if there is any sweeping, I shall try to be on the side of the broom."

There were three principal features in the scheme: 1. The nocturnal arrest of all dangerous representatives, especially the generals; 2. The nocturnal occupation of the palace of the Assembly, and the proper distribution of troops through Paris; 3. The printing and publishing of the President's decrees and proclamations."

The last measure was necessarily first undertaken, and about midnight the printing-office was occupied by a company of soldiers. This was the first actual step in the *coup d'état*, and Fleury supervised its execution. M. de Beville, one of the President's aides-de-camp, carried the MSS. (marked

Rubicon, in the Prince's handwriting) to M. de St. Georges, who was expecting them. He also had been at the theatre. Any hesitation on the part of the printers was overcome by a judicious use of two police agents assigned to each printer, and the work was done by four or five o'clock in the morning. During this time Louis Napoleon had written letters, dismissing those of his ministers who were not in his confidence. M. de Morny was made Minister of the Interior.

At some time during these dark hours, before the excitement of the execution of the plot had begun, one of the persons engaged in the enterprise wished to draw back. Perhaps it was the existing state of legislation in France that prevented M. Ténot from mentioning which one of them it was. He says that Colonel Fleury's energetic intervention put a stop to this weakness. What Colonel Fleury did was to shut himself up in a room with the faint-hearted man, show him a pistol, and threaten to blow out his brains if he refused to go on. About half past two the order that General Magnan had asked for was signed. At four St. Arnaud and Maupas were at their posts. The occupation of the palace of the Assembly, the Palais-Bourbon, was a difficult task, as it was protected by a battalion of infantry and one of artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Niel, whom there had been no attempt to gain over, his character standing too high for that. The questors, Baze and Leflô, who were both capable of resistance, lodged in the palace, so that it was necessary to arrest them and seize the palace suddenly and simultaneously. This task was intrusted to Colonel Espinasse, who accomplished it successfully, under the eyes of M. de Persigny. The questors were taken in bed, both resisting, but uselessly. The arrests of other prominent men were going on at the same time; the stories are all very much alike, — resistance and indignation on one side, odious violence on the other. Changarnier's arrest was considered the most important, and was effected by two officers, fifteen policemen, and forty soldiers. Changarnier must have thought with some bitterness of his words of the preceding June: "They could not bring against the Assembly a battalion, nor a company, nor a squad of our soldiers!" Lamoricière was found in bed and asleep, as most well-conducted persons would be at

four in the morning. His servant called "Robbers," and was bayoneted into silence. At first the General kept silence; then he said to the servant, "Where is the money I put on this mantel-piece?" "It is safe." "Give me my coat." "Sir," said the police agent, "what you have just said is an insult to me." "How do I know that you are not felons?" answered the General, coolly. On his way to prison he attempted to harangue the soldiers from the carriage window, but the policeman pulled a gag from his pocket and threatened to use it if he uttered a single word more. He was taken to Mazas, like the others, in all sixteen representatives, and from sixty to seventy-eight citizens. The affair was over by six or half past six o'clock in the morning. All that the police had been directed to do they had done. All that the army had been directed to do it had done. One officer, indeed, had broken his sword and thrown it at Colonel Espinasse's feet, but this was the one exception to the rule of implicit obedience. M. de Morny was in possession of the Ministry of the Interior, and had telegraphed to the departments. There had been no failure, no accident, no break in the net. The *coup d'état* was complete.

By seven o'clock on the morning of the day of Austerlitz the workmen were stopping on their way to work, and collecting in little groups around the placards on the walls. There were four proclamations, — one to the inhabitants of Paris, signed Maupas; one to the French army, and another to the French people, signed by Louis Napoleon; and the fourth, "in the name of the French people," was signed by Louis Napoleon and countersigned by Morny. There were three points made in these proclamations: 1. That universal suffrage was established; 2. That the *coup d'état* was rendered necessary by the plots of the royalist majority, who were conspiring against the Republic; 3. That the President's one object was to maintain the Republic and to save society. The newspapers had been suppressed, the knowledge of the events of the night was at first scanty, and the lower classes, having their votes once more, were pleased in the beginning. The *bourgeoisie* was distressed and perturbed, and a great legitimist said, "The red would be better than what is coming." No one was allowed to enter the Assembly-room, and some representatives who got

in by a side door were driven out. The majority held a meeting at the Mairie of the tenth arrondissement, at which every shade of opinion was represented. As it was perfect in its organization, it passed a decree, under article sixty-eight, depriving the President of his authority. This decree was signed by two hundred and thirty representatives, including Odilon Barrot, De Beaumont, Berryer, De Broglie, Daru, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, and main-stay of the present Liberal Cabinet, Dufaure, Duvergier de Hauranne, De Falloux, Kératry, the father of the house, Laboulaye, Oscar de Lafayette, Jules de Lasteyrie, Oudinot, Rémusat, Sue, and De Tocqueville.* After a session of some hours they were arrested, carried off to a barrack-room on the Quai d'Orsay, and thence transferred that night or the next morning to different prisons in or near Paris. Morny said that he had them arrested to save them from their own courage; and it is not easy to understand why they wasted their time in talking instead of attempting action. Some other representatives came and joined them in prison. There was difficulty about admitting M. Valette. "Nevertheless," he said, "I have two claims to be admitted to-day: I am a representative of the people and a professor of law." Nor was that the only stab given by an epigram. As the Duke de Montebello was getting into the van to be carried off to Mont-Valérien, he recognized Colonel Feray, the officer commanding the escort. "Gentlemen," he said, "this is the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz, and there is the son-in-law of Marshal Bugeaud putting the son of Marshal Lannes into a prison-van."

There were other incidents during the day, but none of importance. The High Court of Cassation met, by the mouths of five judges decided that there was cause to proceed under the Constitution, and adjourned; met again, decided that there were obstacles in the way of their mandate, and adjourned again. As they soon after took the oath of allegiance to the Prince President, they probably concluded that the obstacles were insurmountable. In the morning the President took a ride and was received without enthusiasm, but without

* In the London Times of December 11 there is a letter from M. de Tocqueville giving a detailed account of this meeting. The letter has been reprinted with the translation of his Life.

hostility. There were some shouts of *Vive la République*, and a few cheers for the Constitution, but the crowd was cold, and the President rode back to his palace and did not show himself again until all was over. When the sun of Austerlitz, which some of us wish had never risen, set that night, the sky was cloudy.

The next morning was dark and rainy, the shops were slow to open, the streets were deserted. Everything looked like an outbreak, and an outbreak came. About nine o'clock on the morning of the 3d the Faubourg St. Antoine was barricaded by about forty men, all Republicans of the better class, some representatives, whose only hope was that the sight of blood — their own blood — would rouse the people from their lethargy. Among these forty were Jules Bastide, Schoelcher, Esquiros, Madier de Montjau, and Baudin, so soon to be the chief figure in the scene. He was one of eight who were standing on the barricade as the soldiers came up; they made a sign to the soldiers to stop, but the line swept on. Some of the representatives then came down from the barricade and advanced to meet the troop, who halted instinctively. There were appeals made in the name of the Constitution, to which the soldiers did not listen, but still they did not fire, until one of the representatives remaining on the barricade mistook the situation and fired at the column, who replied by a general discharge. Baudin fell dead. A young workman by his side was mortally wounded.

Baudin's last moments had been saddened by the following incident. Some minutes before the troops came up, he appealed to a group of workmen, one of whom answered, "Do you think that we are going to have ourselves killed that you may keep your twenty-five francs a day?" (This was the daily pay of a representative.) "Stay where you are a minute, my friend," Baudin answered with a bitter smile, "and you shall see how a man dies for twenty-five francs?"

His blood was not wholly wasted. The news soon spread; other barricades were made, and signs of resistance showed themselves all over Paris. Placards calling to arms were posted, read, and acted on. The barricades were numerous and strong; and the agitation was extreme from the Boulevard Mont-

martre to the Chaussée d'Antin, a quarter rarely in sympathy with revolutionary movements. There was a good deal of fighting all over Paris that afternoon, and during the night of the 3d the Republicans were hopeful. The next morning everything was as they wished it. St. Arnaud had placarded the walls with proclamations forbidding men to collect in crowds or groups, forbidding reading aloud in the streets, and threatening instant death to any one taken with arms in his hands. Consequently immense crowds of workmen were gathered round the Republican placards, listening to loud reading and talking to armed men. "Paris is off," said a veteran in revolutions. "Let a regiment hesitate or a legion leave, and Louis Napoleon is lost!" cried Jules Favre. M. de Maupas was frightened out of his wicked wits. The publication of a part of the correspondence between him and Morny is one of Dr. Véron's indiscretions, for which we cannot be too grateful. It shows Maupas writing on the morning of the 4th to the Minister of the Interior: "Barri- cades in the Rue Dauphiné. I am surrounded. Tell General Sanboul. I am without force." Again: "Gatherings on the Pont Neuf; firing on the Quai aux Fleurs; compact crowds near the Prefecture of Police. They are firing through a grating. What shall I do?" Morny's reply was: "Answer by firing through your grating." Again Maupas writes to Morny: "They say that the 12th Dragoons have come from St. Germain with the Count de Chambord in their ranks as a soldier. I hardly believe it." To this Morny replied: "And I don't believe it at all." How many men had it taken to terrify M. de Maupas after this fashion? Twenty or thirty young fellows from the Latin Quarter, great was whose surprise when, years after, they found how terrific they had been.

Certainly Maupas was not the most valiant of men; but others were frightened too. Morny, who had gone out to see for himself, came back to find his followers pale and uncertain. Nothing, however, disconcerted that man of silk and steel. "What," he said gayly, "yesterday you wished barri- cades, now you have got them and you are not satisfied." He, however, was satisfied. He had seen more than one revolution, and he did not mean that the Three Days of December should be quoted with the Three Days of February and the Three

Days of July. On the night of the 3d, at a military council at which were present St. Arnaud, Magnan, the leading generals of division, and perhaps the President, Morny laid down his plan of campaign, which he afterwards, with great difficulty but with perfect success, saw executed. It was this: to concentrate the troops in masses, take care of them, feed them well, and keep them away from the people; to suppress small posts; to abstain from patrols, to permit the construction of barricades. Then, carefully choosing the time for action, to attack these suddenly with compact forces and crush out all resistance.

About one o'clock on the 4th the time for action, according to M. de Morny's plan, had come. The soldiers, who had been kept free from fatigue for two days, and had been given enough—much more than enough—of meat and wine and rest, were brought into action between one and two o'clock. Morny's order was, "Strike hard on the Boulevard,"—an order fully executed by a sudden cannonade of shot and shell poured upon an unoffending crowd of men, women, and children, shopkeepers, servants, travellers, who crowded the sidewalks and windows to see the soldiers, who now filled the Boulevard from the extremity of the Boulevard Bonne Nouvelle to the Boulevard des Italiens. The barricades throughout the city were carried, after more or less fighting at each. Men taken with arms in their hands or fingers blackened with powder were shot; a woman carrying twenty-five daggers was arrested and shot; a gardener, with a weapon under his blouse, was shot and thrown into the Seine, though he lived to protest that his carbine was out of order; a child of seven was shot; nine men were shot "in their own houses." There is no use in multiplying these details. They prove the resistance of the people; they prove "the benignity of the son of Hortense"; they also prove the vigor and skill of M. de Morny. His plan was a complete success. Through the afternoon of the 4th the bodies of the dead lay in their blood along the streets. The morning of the 5th showed that the spirit of resistance was broken. The people of Paris were in a stupor of horror, and few dared to leave their houses. "Never in the memory of man," says the *Moniteur*, "have the streets worn so sombre

an aspect." That day, and the next and the next, the dead — at least three hundred and eighty citizens and twenty-seven soldiers — were buried, in the sight of sullen, silent crowds. On the 5th Louis Napoleon's triumph was assured; on the 8th he declared that order was restored. The *coup* was complete.

There was work still to do, but not such bloody work. Almost all the members of the majority were let out of prison on the 6th and 7th; but other arrests were made by the thousand, from all ranks of life, — "a coat for every blouse," a statement which is as exact as an epigram can well be. They were all Republicans and received different punishments, generally exile or transportation. Some of them have come back and done good service in the Opposition. Some of them, who did not choose to return, find it hard to live and hard to die across the French frontier, but they too have done good service.

With the subsequent history of the leading men who took part on either side on the 2d December M. Ténot does not meddle. Most of them went out of politics and into literature; some, like Montalembert and Baroche, were led to believe that they must support Louis Napoleon or endless anarchy. Here it may be said, "And what of the long list of honorable men who belonged to the Consultative Commission?" But how do we know who did belong to it? The list was published December 3d, and Léon Faucher's name was on it; his indignant letter of remonstrance produced some effect; but Joseph Perier's remonstrances had none, and he was seen frantically tearing his name from the posted lists and calling the bystanders to witness that it was a lie. Count Beugnot, rumor says, resorted to the expedient of leaving his cards inscribed "Ex-representative, not member of the Consultative Commission"; and the Duke d'Albuféra went in person to M. de Morny to protest against the use of his name. It is said that Morny answered, "Sir, we needed your name, and we took it; as for your person, we have nothing to do with that; only I invite you to keep yourself quiet." It is hard when the son of a man like Suchet must take an answer like this from a man who bought a name and borrowed a grandmother.

On the 20th of December Louis Napoleon was absolved

from all his sins of the 2d by the vote of the people in his behalf. The next year he became Emperor.

That is the story of the *coup d'état*, and a very ugly story it is. M. Ténot has secured for himself the place of the real historian of the Second of December; and at the same time his book has had all the success of a sensation novel. Three editions in a fortnight are more than most inventors of murders aspire to; and the speeches and excitement over Baudin's grave, and the subsequent trials and fines, proved how thoroughly the French had read and digested the book. The censorship could not meddle with it, for it is a book without an adjective; but the new generation to whom the book was addressed have had a full answer to their question, "How came this ruler here?"

AGNES IRWIN.

ART. VIII. — THE PROSPECTS OF THE POLITICAL ART.

IN the literature of politics there is perhaps no word which meets the eye so often as the word "liberty," and there is no nobler word in it. There is certainly none about which so many touching associations cluster. We never speak of it without calling up a thousand memories of disasters and triumphs which are among the greatest glories of the human race. The Old Cause, as Sidney called it on the scaffold, has, like religion, its saints and martyrs and legends; and there is, perhaps, nothing, except religion, for which men have done and endured so much. Nearly all the great revolutions which form the stages in human progress were accomplished in its name, and so strong is the hold it has secured in the popular imagination, that we always speak of it as the highest political good. A people which has it is commonly believed to have all; a people which has it not, to have less than nothing.

And yet, when we come to inquire what this liberty is which has, for so many thousand years, kept the world in a blaze, we find it is in itself rather an ideal than a tangible good; that the long struggle for it has been rather an energetic vin-